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Abstract: This paper examines the welfare of consumers in an incomplete markets
economy with extrinsic uncertainty. It is shown that the utility of one consumer may
be minimized at the Walrasian allocation relative to all other equilibrium allocations
for a given security structure. Thus, this consumer will have no incentive to trade the
new securities if they complete the insurance markets.
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One of the key ideas in the literature on sunspot equilibrium or extrinsic uncertainty
is the “Philadelphia Pholk Theorem,” [15] which says that if there is any distortion
in the economy which renders equilibrium outcomes ineﬃcient, then it is very likely
that sunspots will have non-trivial eﬀects. This has been conﬁrmed in a wide variety
of environments including restricted participation economies, the double inﬁnity of
overlapping generations economies, incomplete markets, externalities, public goods,
rationing, bounded rationality, etc. A counterpart to the PPT is the sunspot ineﬀec-
tivity result ﬁrst due to David Cass and Karl Shell [6] and clariﬁed in [12] (see also
[2]) which says that in ﬁnite dimensional competitive economies, if consumers are risk
averse, the set of feasible allocations convex, and markets complete, then sunspots
will not matter. Thus, in ﬁnite economies the eﬀect of sunspots hinges on these three
conditions being satisﬁed. The ﬁrst two conditions are given by the primitives of the
model. The third is to an extent endogenous. If markets are incomplete, then a nat-
ural question is why do they remain so if introducing new securities can neutralize
the sunspots so that the non-sunspot contingent Walrasian allocations are the only
possible outcomes?
While the literature on ﬁnancial innovations (which focusses primarily on the situation
with intrinsic uncertainty) sheds some light on this issue (see [1] and [9] for surveys),
in the sunspots literature a compelling viewpoint is that as soon as markets are com-
plete, consumers can always introduce new sunspot variables to coordinate on and
hence, the markets become incomplete once again ([4]). This however does not answer
when will new securities be introduced. This paper also addresses the issue of market
incompleteness. We take the viewpoint that if markets are incomplete, and ﬁnancial
innovation is to take place, we should ask whether the securities will in fact be traded
in the market. We show there may be no incentives for the consumers to trade the new
securities and hence, the economy will continue to be susceptible to sunspots in the
face of ﬁnancial innovations. This result is stark in that one consumer will prefer any
1sunspot allocation to the Walrasian allocation and thus, have no incentive to trade
the completing securities.
The environment we consider has only extrinsic uncertainty. We show in a one-good
economy with only extrinsic uncertainty ([6]) and two consumers, the utility of one
consumer is maximized while that of the other is minimized at the Walrasian allo-
cation. This result is global under some preferences structures, and is local under
general preferences (if some restrictions are satisﬁed). Thus, if the status quo has
market incompletenss, any ﬁnancial innovation that will complete the markets is un-
likely to take place. We ﬁrst give a parametric example and then generalize the result
to an open class of preferences (consumers must have a suﬃciently high precautionary
savings motive ([14])) and general endowments. As we look at the case of one good in
each state, eﬀects relating to changes in relative prices within each state are not the
key to the welfare eﬀects (for multiple goods models see [13], [8], [5], and [10]).
We take the viewpoint that the consumers will only trade if the new allocation lies in
the upper contour set of their status quo outcomes, i.e., trade is individually rational.
This requires consumers to compare allocations across diﬀerent security structures. As
we are looking at rational expectations equilibria, it is already assumed that consumers
understand the equilibrium map. We are, thus, requiring the consumers to use this
information. To ﬁrmly ground this on strategic foundations, in the spirit of Cournot-
Walras models of ﬁnancial innovation (see for example [1]), we could model a two stage
trading game where in the ﬁrst stage consumers decide which securities to trade taking
into account that they will act competitively given the set of securities. Alternatively,
one could also think of the problem as one where a planner has to choose whether
to introduce new securities, and the innovation takes place only if it makes no one
worse oﬀ. Another interpretation would be that there is a two stage procedure where
the consumers ﬁrst vote whether to introduce a security, and then given the outcome,
trade competitively. We are open about the interpretations and thus consider only
the outcome of the second stage.
2The result on the welfare properties of the equilibrium outcomes is consistent with
what is commonly known about one-good incomplete market economies: the equilib-
rium outcomes are constrained Pareto eﬃcient ([7], and [11]). However, as mentioned
above we have a stronger statement on the Walrasian allocation vis-a-vis other equi-
librium allocations that may emerge.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First we deﬁne the economy and then present a
parametric example where the entire equilibrium set is characterised and the welfare
eﬀects identiﬁed. This is extended ﬁrst to general preferences, and then to include
non-corner endowments as well.
2 Economy with Financial Assets
Consider a pure-exchange economy with 2 periods. In period one there is one state
s = 0, and S < 1 states in the second period, s = 1;:::;S. These are indexed
by the superscript s. In each state there is a single consumption good. There are 2
consumers indexed by the subscript h = 1;2. The consumption plan for consumer h





h). The consumption set for the consumers,Xh, is the
S + 1 dimensional positive orthant. Both the consumers have identical preferences











The sub-utility functions vh(¢) are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and thrice-
continuously diﬀerentiable. The endowments of the two consumers are !1 = (®;1 ¡
®;:::;1 ¡ ®) and !2 = (1 ¡ ®;®;:::;®) respectively, with ® 2 (0;1]. The consumers
can transfer wealth across the states using a nominal bond. The return matrix of the
nominal bond is R = (¡1;1;:::;1)T. The purchase of the nominal bond for consumer
h is denoted as µh, and the excess demand for commodities by zh. The prices of the
consumption goods are normalized so that p = (1;p1;:::;ps;:::;pS).
3The budget constraints are given by:
z
0




h = µh; s = 1;:::;S (3)
Deﬁnition 1: An GEI equilibrium in the economy is a vector (p;µ1;µ2) such that
(i) µh maximizes utility (1) for the consumers subject to the budget constraints (2-3).
(ii) The bond market clears, i.e., µ1 + µ2 = 0.
Deﬁnition 2: Sunspots do not matter if the allocations are independent of the states





h = ¢¢¢ = x
S
h; h = 1;2:
3 The Leading Example
In this example, S = 2, ® = 1, and the preferences of the two consumers are restricted














To solve for the equilibria ﬁrst solve for the demand of the two consumers.
For consumer 1, substitute the budget equations into the maximand to get
















, which is independent of p1; p2.












































































































































) is not a solution as non-negativity conditions (for consumer 2) are violated. The
only solution is the branch through (1;1): Thus, there is a unique (state) symmetric
equilibrium which corresponds to the Walrasian equilibrium. In this economy, the
symmetric equilibrium prices are p1 = p2 = 1.
Thus, the incompleteness of the markets is giving rise to the well known indeterminacy
of equilibria ([4]). While the indeterminacy shown is price indeterminacy, there will
be real indeterminacy as well.
From [3] it is known that the equilibrium allocations lie on the intersection of the
oﬀer curves of the consumers. The supporting prices (p and p0 for the two consumers
5respectively) however, in general need not be the same. If they are, then the economy
is at a Walrasian equilibrium.











































curve of consumer 2, p10 + p20 = 1. Substituting this into the oﬀer curve of consumer

























As we have taken the intersection of the two oﬀer curves into account (the oﬀer curve




), all the information of the
equilibrium is contained in this equation.
Deﬁne the parameter ¸ =
1 ¡ p10





















: ¸ 2 (¡1;1)
)
: (11)
From this we derive the equation for x1
2;x2
2 by setting the second coordinate of the
above equal to x1
2 and the third coordinate equal to x2
























) satisﬁes the equilibrium
conditions. Thus, there is a 1-dimensional real indeterminacy as well.
To see examine the welfare eﬀects, one can work with either equation (7) or equa-
tion (12). Working with the latter, it is easy to see that the Walrasian equilibrium
minimizes x1
2x2













































can be reduced to ³1(w1(p1;p2)) = ¡p1p2, where ³1 is a strictly increasing function.
The indirect utility of consumer 1 is maximized at the Walrasian prices on the equi-
















































(2p1 ¡ 1)(2p1 ¡ 2)
4(p1(3p1 ¡ 2))2 :
7This function is decreasing in the interval (
3
4
;1) and increasing in (1;1), with a critical















































1. The result on the maximum and minimum of utility at the Walrasian equilibrium
is global for this economy.
2. Note that the equilibria will be constrained Pareto optimal as this is a 1-good
economy.
3. The results of [11] for the one good economy do not apply as there: H ¸
Maxf2;J + 1g and S ¸ H + (J + 1), where S is the number of states in the
second period, J number of assets initially, and H number of consumers. In this
economy S = 2, H = 2, J = 1.
4. The results of [10] and [5] do not apply. These results are for multiple good
economies, and in [10] the restriction is : S ¸ H(J + 2) + H(J + 1)(J + 2)=2,
while in [5] it is: S ¡ J ¸ 2H ¡ 1.
5. This example can be generalized. This is the content of the next two proposi-
tions.
84 Proposition 1
In this economy, for an open class of preferences the utility of consumer 2 is minimized
(locally) at the Walrasian equilibrium. A suﬃcient condition is that consumer 2 has








In other words, the Index of Absolute Prudence ([14], p.




Other than not imposing log-linearity on preferences, the structure of the economy is
the same as in Example 1. As in equilibrium it must be the case that µ1 = ¡µ2, set
µ1 = µ = ¡µ2. After substitution of the budget constraints into the utility function of
consumer 2 we have:
u2(µ;p
1;p
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Now y = (µ;p2) = Ã(p1), locally.
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At the Walrasian equilibrium p1 = p2, and µ =
1
2
. Substituting into the above and






















































































































































































































































































































































































































v0 + v00 +
v000
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If this is positive, then the utility of consumer 2 is minimized at the Walrasian allo-
cation. Q.E.D.
Remarks:
1. G00 > 0 for the following utility functions
(a) The log-linear utility function: logx.
(b) The utility function:
x1¡²
1 ¡ ²
; ² < 1.
2. The intuition for the result is the following: Due to the precautionary motive,
consumer 2 wants to consume less in period 1 as prices vary due to extrinsic
uncertainty. Consumer 1 has ﬁxed demand in period 1. Thus, consumer 1’s
endowment is ‘relatively less valuable’ and consumer 2’s endowment is ‘more
valuable.’ If the increase in value of endowment is large enough, then this will
outweigh the loss in utility due to greater uncertainty. 1
5 Proposition 2
This result extends to the case of S < 1 states, and general endowment structures:
!1 = (®;1 ¡ ®;:::;1 ¡ ®) and !2 = (1 ¡ ®;®;:::;®) with ® 2 (0;1]. A suﬃcient














The structure of the economy is similar to that in the previous proposition. There
1We thank Todd Keister for suggesting this interpretation.
13are, however, now S states in period 2. Thus, s = 0;1;:::;S: The endowments of the











In the Walrasian equilibrium of the economy, we have:
xh(0) = x
0
h = ::: = x
s
h = ::: = x
S




The budget constraints are:
x
0









h + µh; 1 · s · S: (26)
Substituting the budget equations into the utility functions and imposing the market
clearing equation µ1 = ¡µ2 = µ, we get the following maximization problems for the
two consumers.





v(1 ¡ ® +
µ
ps) (27)








The set of ﬁrst order equations deﬁne the equilibrium set, E.
Á1(µ;p) = ¡v

























































































































































































































Thus, rÁ1 is not collinear to rÁ2, and E is locally a (S ¡ 1) manifold.
The issue is now to see that the utility of consumer 2 is minimized at the Walrasian
15equilibrium.








s.t. Á1(µ;p) = 0
Á1(µ;p) = 0:
The tangent space at the Walrasian point, w¤, is:
(˜ µ; ˜ p) ¢ rÁ1(w




(˜ µ; ˜ p) ¢ rÁ2(w







˜ µ = 0:
The Lagrangian is:
L(µ;p;¸1;¸2) = u2(µ;p) + ¸1Á1(µ;p) + ¸2Á2(µ;p):




¤;¸1;¸2) = 0 , 0 + ¸12v
00 + ¸2(¡2v
00) = 0 (35)
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1. If v(x) =
x1¡²
1 ¡ ²




















²+1(¡1 + (2® ¡ 1)(² + 1))
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